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LitCovid-PubTator

LitCovid-PMC-OGER-BB

{"project":"LitCovid-PMC-OGER-BB","denotations":[{"id":"T129","span":{"begin":42,"end":53},"obj":"UBERON:0001004"},{"id":"T128","span":{"begin":80,"end":91},"obj":"NCBITaxon:11118"},{"id":"T127","span":{"begin":272,"end":276},"obj":"SP_10"},{"id":"T126","span":{"begin":612,"end":616},"obj":"SP_10"},{"id":"T125","span":{"begin":1258,"end":1267},"obj":"GO:0043335"},{"id":"T124","span":{"begin":2097,"end":2101},"obj":"SP_10"},{"id":"T123","span":{"begin":5422,"end":5428},"obj":"NCBITaxon:9606"},{"id":"T122","span":{"begin":5476,"end":5481},"obj":"NCBITaxon:10239"},{"id":"T121","span":{"begin":5724,"end":5730},"obj":"NCBITaxon:9606"},{"id":"T120","span":{"begin":5750,"end":5761},"obj":"NCBITaxon:11118"},{"id":"T119","span":{"begin":5845,"end":5851},"obj":"NCBITaxon:9606"},{"id":"T118","span":{"begin":6943,"end":6947},"obj":"SP_10"},{"id":"T117","span":{"begin":7191,"end":7195},"obj":"SP_10"},{"id":"T116","span":{"begin":7201,"end":7205},"obj":"SP_9"},{"id":"T115","span":{"begin":9024,"end":9030},"obj":"NCBITaxon:9606"},{"id":"T114","span":{"begin":9098,"end":9103},"obj":"NCBITaxon:10239"}],"text":"Discussion\nThe emergence of a significant respiratory illness linked to a novel coronavirus represents a test of the global capacity to detect and mange emerging disease threats. Its emergence in China adds an additional dimension in the light of previous experience with SARS. The timing of the outbreak immediately before the Chinese Lunar New Year with its attendant population movements adds extra risk and urgency to the response.\nThe rapid sharing of information in this outbreak and the speed of the coordinated response both in the country and internationally suggest that lessons have been learned from SARS that improve global capacity. The international networks and forums that now exist have facilitated the bringing together of expertise from around the world to focus research and development efforts and maximise the impact.\nAt this early stage in the outbreak information remains incomplete and key clinical and epidemiological questions have not yet been answered, but the deficit seems to be due more to the constraints of investigating an emerging disease than to any unwillingness to engage and share information with partners.\nThere are some indications of areas where further improvement is necessary. The global media response to the unfolding events has been relatively balanced and informed but the nuances of the evolving situation have not been critically examined in partnership with the media and as a result the public perception of the risk may be exaggerated – although it of course remains possible that the outbreak will develop in a way that matches up to the perceived risk. The lack of appreciation of the uncertainties in determining a meaningful case fatality rate and the significance of ascertainment bias at the beginning of an outbreak, along with the impact of aggressive case finding on case numbers, are examples of where understanding could be improved. This is always a challenging process when balancing the resources focussed on analysing the situation on the ground with resources directed at interpreting the information for journalists but in SARS, the R0 was seen to decrease in response to information reaching the public and the public then adopting risk reduction actions [6]; so accurate public risk communication is critical to success. It would be helpful to find a forum where this can be explored with the media community after the event.\nThe increase in access to early information from diverse sources including media and social media adds an important dimension to identifying and tracking new events globally and is a key part of the overall epidemic intelligence system. However, it is also a potential source of disinformation. When, as has been seen in this outbreak, the volume of information coming in exceeds any capacity to collate and analyse it and to attempt to cross-reference and verify separate items, there is a risk that the information fuels speculation and media and public concern. Again there is a fine balance between information that encourages appropriate risk avoidance actions and information that encourages inappropriate actions; however the public health is usually better served by more information rather than less.\nThe role of a declaration of a PHEIC in managing a serious outbreak has been questioned in the light of Ebola in West Africa and in the Democratic Republic of Congo [9] and has been challenged again with this outbreak. The binary nature of a PHEIC declaration (either an event is a PHEIC or it isn't – there are no intermediate options) and the specificity of the three defined criteria for a PHEIC have caused difficulty for Emergency Committees in considering whether a given event should be a PHEIC. The lack of a clear understanding of what a PHEIC declaration is meant to achieve adds to the Emergency Committee's difficulties, as does the relative paucity of clinical and epidemiological answers at this stage of the investigation. In this instance the Emergency Committee were divided in coming to a conclusion but decided on balance that the current situation, although an emergency, should not as yet be declared a PHEIC [2]. As with Ebola in the DRC, there has been criticism of the WHO for this decision but, as with Ebola, it is not immediately clear what would be different in the response if a PHEIC was declared.\nThe WHO is working on improving the way in which Emergency Committees develop their advice for the Director General but, as recommended by this Emergency Committee and the post-Ebola IHR Review Committee in 2015, the development of an intermediate alert alongside WHO's risk assessment process may be helpful.\nA key function of a PHEIC declaration is that it is the (only) gateway to the WHO Temporary Recommendations on possible travel and trade restrictions to limit international spread of a disease. In this case several countries globally had already implemented entry screening at airports and China had begun closing down international travel from Wuhan before the Emergency Committee had finished their deliberations. While the WHO would not, and could not, interfere with the sovereign decisions of member states, the lack of influence on travel and trade decisions could prove problematic.\nAlongside the speed of the response in this outbreak, we have seen dramatic changes in the scale of the response. The imposition of very extensive quarantine measures on millions of people as an attempt to break the transmission of the virus is unprecedented. We do not know whether they will be effective; indeed we do not know how we will determine if they have been effective – what end point can we measure that will provide an answer to that question? If recent suggestions that people infected with this coronavirus may be infectious while incubating or asymptomatic, and the reports that up to 5 m people left Wuhan before the travel restrictions were imposed, are confirmed, the efficacy of these control measures will be more challenged.\nGiven the likely impact on at least the Chinese economy and probably the global economy, it will be important to understand the role and the effectiveness of public health measures on this scale for the future.\nHowever, the imposition of these dramatic measures does also raise a wider question: if there is an impact from these measures, what other countries would (or could) implement such measures? Would other countries accept the self-imposed economic damage that China has accepted to try and contain this outbreak? Is it reasonable to consider that national governments would close down public transport into and out of London, New York or Paris in the week before Christmas even if it were shown to be an effective control measure?\nThese decisions and questions cross the interface between public health, science and politics. The response to this outbreak in China was inevitably influenced by the historical reaction to the country's response to SARS and the world's suspicion of China's lack of cooperation at that time. The current response is therefore framed within a context of not wanting to be seen to be behaving in the same way with this event.\nThis may indicate another impact of the SARS (and MERS and Ebola) experience on the response to subsequent outbreaks – a tendency to look at worst case scenarios and respond accordingly and a fear of ‘getting it wrong’. This can deter leaders at all levels, from outbreak teams to national governments, from making judgements when all the information they would like is not available in case those judgments turn out to be wrong when the full information becomes available.\nIn emergency response it is generally better to over-react and then scale back if necessary rather than under-react and then act too late. Response should be on a ‘no regrets’ basis – make the best decisions possible on the basis of the best information and science available at the time but do not judge or criticise if later information suggests a different course of action. The early response must recognise what is known and what is not known and look at what of the unknowns can reasonably be estimated by reference to previous outbreaks, similar pathogens, early reporting and modelling, etc. The risk assessment and response can then be modified and refined as information on the unknowns evolves.\nKey to that approach, however, is confidence that decisions will not be criticised based on information that was not available at the time. It is also important to be ready to change decisions when the available information changes – something that both scientists and politicians can find difficult.\nIn that context, China should not be judged for implementing what might appear to be extreme measures but China should also be prepared to discontinue the measures quickly if evidence suggests they are not the best way to solve the problem. By closing airports the international spread from Wuhan may be decreased, but success will depend on how effective the measures really are at stopping people moving out of the affected area as well as on the behaviour of the virus. As always, only time will tell – but time is scarce."}

LitCovid-PD-FMA-UBERON

{"project":"LitCovid-PD-FMA-UBERON","denotations":[{"id":"T2","span":{"begin":7699,"end":7703},"obj":"Body_part"}],"attributes":[{"id":"A2","pred":"fma_id","subj":"T2","obj":"http://purl.org/sig/ont/fma/fma25056"}],"text":"Discussion\nThe emergence of a significant respiratory illness linked to a novel coronavirus represents a test of the global capacity to detect and mange emerging disease threats. Its emergence in China adds an additional dimension in the light of previous experience with SARS. The timing of the outbreak immediately before the Chinese Lunar New Year with its attendant population movements adds extra risk and urgency to the response.\nThe rapid sharing of information in this outbreak and the speed of the coordinated response both in the country and internationally suggest that lessons have been learned from SARS that improve global capacity. The international networks and forums that now exist have facilitated the bringing together of expertise from around the world to focus research and development efforts and maximise the impact.\nAt this early stage in the outbreak information remains incomplete and key clinical and epidemiological questions have not yet been answered, but the deficit seems to be due more to the constraints of investigating an emerging disease than to any unwillingness to engage and share information with partners.\nThere are some indications of areas where further improvement is necessary. The global media response to the unfolding events has been relatively balanced and informed but the nuances of the evolving situation have not been critically examined in partnership with the media and as a result the public perception of the risk may be exaggerated – although it of course remains possible that the outbreak will develop in a way that matches up to the perceived risk. The lack of appreciation of the uncertainties in determining a meaningful case fatality rate and the significance of ascertainment bias at the beginning of an outbreak, along with the impact of aggressive case finding on case numbers, are examples of where understanding could be improved. This is always a challenging process when balancing the resources focussed on analysing the situation on the ground with resources directed at interpreting the information for journalists but in SARS, the R0 was seen to decrease in response to information reaching the public and the public then adopting risk reduction actions [6]; so accurate public risk communication is critical to success. It would be helpful to find a forum where this can be explored with the media community after the event.\nThe increase in access to early information from diverse sources including media and social media adds an important dimension to identifying and tracking new events globally and is a key part of the overall epidemic intelligence system. However, it is also a potential source of disinformation. When, as has been seen in this outbreak, the volume of information coming in exceeds any capacity to collate and analyse it and to attempt to cross-reference and verify separate items, there is a risk that the information fuels speculation and media and public concern. Again there is a fine balance between information that encourages appropriate risk avoidance actions and information that encourages inappropriate actions; however the public health is usually better served by more information rather than less.\nThe role of a declaration of a PHEIC in managing a serious outbreak has been questioned in the light of Ebola in West Africa and in the Democratic Republic of Congo [9] and has been challenged again with this outbreak. The binary nature of a PHEIC declaration (either an event is a PHEIC or it isn't – there are no intermediate options) and the specificity of the three defined criteria for a PHEIC have caused difficulty for Emergency Committees in considering whether a given event should be a PHEIC. The lack of a clear understanding of what a PHEIC declaration is meant to achieve adds to the Emergency Committee's difficulties, as does the relative paucity of clinical and epidemiological answers at this stage of the investigation. In this instance the Emergency Committee were divided in coming to a conclusion but decided on balance that the current situation, although an emergency, should not as yet be declared a PHEIC [2]. As with Ebola in the DRC, there has been criticism of the WHO for this decision but, as with Ebola, it is not immediately clear what would be different in the response if a PHEIC was declared.\nThe WHO is working on improving the way in which Emergency Committees develop their advice for the Director General but, as recommended by this Emergency Committee and the post-Ebola IHR Review Committee in 2015, the development of an intermediate alert alongside WHO's risk assessment process may be helpful.\nA key function of a PHEIC declaration is that it is the (only) gateway to the WHO Temporary Recommendations on possible travel and trade restrictions to limit international spread of a disease. In this case several countries globally had already implemented entry screening at airports and China had begun closing down international travel from Wuhan before the Emergency Committee had finished their deliberations. While the WHO would not, and could not, interfere with the sovereign decisions of member states, the lack of influence on travel and trade decisions could prove problematic.\nAlongside the speed of the response in this outbreak, we have seen dramatic changes in the scale of the response. The imposition of very extensive quarantine measures on millions of people as an attempt to break the transmission of the virus is unprecedented. We do not know whether they will be effective; indeed we do not know how we will determine if they have been effective – what end point can we measure that will provide an answer to that question? If recent suggestions that people infected with this coronavirus may be infectious while incubating or asymptomatic, and the reports that up to 5 m people left Wuhan before the travel restrictions were imposed, are confirmed, the efficacy of these control measures will be more challenged.\nGiven the likely impact on at least the Chinese economy and probably the global economy, it will be important to understand the role and the effectiveness of public health measures on this scale for the future.\nHowever, the imposition of these dramatic measures does also raise a wider question: if there is an impact from these measures, what other countries would (or could) implement such measures? Would other countries accept the self-imposed economic damage that China has accepted to try and contain this outbreak? Is it reasonable to consider that national governments would close down public transport into and out of London, New York or Paris in the week before Christmas even if it were shown to be an effective control measure?\nThese decisions and questions cross the interface between public health, science and politics. The response to this outbreak in China was inevitably influenced by the historical reaction to the country's response to SARS and the world's suspicion of China's lack of cooperation at that time. The current response is therefore framed within a context of not wanting to be seen to be behaving in the same way with this event.\nThis may indicate another impact of the SARS (and MERS and Ebola) experience on the response to subsequent outbreaks – a tendency to look at worst case scenarios and respond accordingly and a fear of ‘getting it wrong’. This can deter leaders at all levels, from outbreak teams to national governments, from making judgements when all the information they would like is not available in case those judgments turn out to be wrong when the full information becomes available.\nIn emergency response it is generally better to over-react and then scale back if necessary rather than under-react and then act too late. Response should be on a ‘no regrets’ basis – make the best decisions possible on the basis of the best information and science available at the time but do not judge or criticise if later information suggests a different course of action. The early response must recognise what is known and what is not known and look at what of the unknowns can reasonably be estimated by reference to previous outbreaks, similar pathogens, early reporting and modelling, etc. The risk assessment and response can then be modified and refined as information on the unknowns evolves.\nKey to that approach, however, is confidence that decisions will not be criticised based on information that was not available at the time. It is also important to be ready to change decisions when the available information changes – something that both scientists and politicians can find difficult.\nIn that context, China should not be judged for implementing what might appear to be extreme measures but China should also be prepared to discontinue the measures quickly if evidence suggests they are not the best way to solve the problem. By closing airports the international spread from Wuhan may be decreased, but success will depend on how effective the measures really are at stopping people moving out of the affected area as well as on the behaviour of the virus. As always, only time will tell – but time is scarce."}

LitCovid-PD-UBERON

{"project":"LitCovid-PD-UBERON","denotations":[{"id":"T2","span":{"begin":5331,"end":5336},"obj":"Body_part"},{"id":"T3","span":{"begin":6176,"end":6181},"obj":"Body_part"},{"id":"T4","span":{"begin":7693,"end":7698},"obj":"Body_part"}],"attributes":[{"id":"A2","pred":"uberon_id","subj":"T2","obj":"http://purl.obolibrary.org/obo/UBERON_0002542"},{"id":"A3","pred":"uberon_id","subj":"T3","obj":"http://purl.obolibrary.org/obo/UBERON_0002542"},{"id":"A4","pred":"uberon_id","subj":"T4","obj":"http://purl.obolibrary.org/obo/UBERON_0002542"}],"text":"Discussion\nThe emergence of a significant respiratory illness linked to a novel coronavirus represents a test of the global capacity to detect and mange emerging disease threats. Its emergence in China adds an additional dimension in the light of previous experience with SARS. The timing of the outbreak immediately before the Chinese Lunar New Year with its attendant population movements adds extra risk and urgency to the response.\nThe rapid sharing of information in this outbreak and the speed of the coordinated response both in the country and internationally suggest that lessons have been learned from SARS that improve global capacity. The international networks and forums that now exist have facilitated the bringing together of expertise from around the world to focus research and development efforts and maximise the impact.\nAt this early stage in the outbreak information remains incomplete and key clinical and epidemiological questions have not yet been answered, but the deficit seems to be due more to the constraints of investigating an emerging disease than to any unwillingness to engage and share information with partners.\nThere are some indications of areas where further improvement is necessary. The global media response to the unfolding events has been relatively balanced and informed but the nuances of the evolving situation have not been critically examined in partnership with the media and as a result the public perception of the risk may be exaggerated – although it of course remains possible that the outbreak will develop in a way that matches up to the perceived risk. The lack of appreciation of the uncertainties in determining a meaningful case fatality rate and the significance of ascertainment bias at the beginning of an outbreak, along with the impact of aggressive case finding on case numbers, are examples of where understanding could be improved. This is always a challenging process when balancing the resources focussed on analysing the situation on the ground with resources directed at interpreting the information for journalists but in SARS, the R0 was seen to decrease in response to information reaching the public and the public then adopting risk reduction actions [6]; so accurate public risk communication is critical to success. It would be helpful to find a forum where this can be explored with the media community after the event.\nThe increase in access to early information from diverse sources including media and social media adds an important dimension to identifying and tracking new events globally and is a key part of the overall epidemic intelligence system. However, it is also a potential source of disinformation. When, as has been seen in this outbreak, the volume of information coming in exceeds any capacity to collate and analyse it and to attempt to cross-reference and verify separate items, there is a risk that the information fuels speculation and media and public concern. Again there is a fine balance between information that encourages appropriate risk avoidance actions and information that encourages inappropriate actions; however the public health is usually better served by more information rather than less.\nThe role of a declaration of a PHEIC in managing a serious outbreak has been questioned in the light of Ebola in West Africa and in the Democratic Republic of Congo [9] and has been challenged again with this outbreak. The binary nature of a PHEIC declaration (either an event is a PHEIC or it isn't – there are no intermediate options) and the specificity of the three defined criteria for a PHEIC have caused difficulty for Emergency Committees in considering whether a given event should be a PHEIC. The lack of a clear understanding of what a PHEIC declaration is meant to achieve adds to the Emergency Committee's difficulties, as does the relative paucity of clinical and epidemiological answers at this stage of the investigation. In this instance the Emergency Committee were divided in coming to a conclusion but decided on balance that the current situation, although an emergency, should not as yet be declared a PHEIC [2]. As with Ebola in the DRC, there has been criticism of the WHO for this decision but, as with Ebola, it is not immediately clear what would be different in the response if a PHEIC was declared.\nThe WHO is working on improving the way in which Emergency Committees develop their advice for the Director General but, as recommended by this Emergency Committee and the post-Ebola IHR Review Committee in 2015, the development of an intermediate alert alongside WHO's risk assessment process may be helpful.\nA key function of a PHEIC declaration is that it is the (only) gateway to the WHO Temporary Recommendations on possible travel and trade restrictions to limit international spread of a disease. In this case several countries globally had already implemented entry screening at airports and China had begun closing down international travel from Wuhan before the Emergency Committee had finished their deliberations. While the WHO would not, and could not, interfere with the sovereign decisions of member states, the lack of influence on travel and trade decisions could prove problematic.\nAlongside the speed of the response in this outbreak, we have seen dramatic changes in the scale of the response. The imposition of very extensive quarantine measures on millions of people as an attempt to break the transmission of the virus is unprecedented. We do not know whether they will be effective; indeed we do not know how we will determine if they have been effective – what end point can we measure that will provide an answer to that question? If recent suggestions that people infected with this coronavirus may be infectious while incubating or asymptomatic, and the reports that up to 5 m people left Wuhan before the travel restrictions were imposed, are confirmed, the efficacy of these control measures will be more challenged.\nGiven the likely impact on at least the Chinese economy and probably the global economy, it will be important to understand the role and the effectiveness of public health measures on this scale for the future.\nHowever, the imposition of these dramatic measures does also raise a wider question: if there is an impact from these measures, what other countries would (or could) implement such measures? Would other countries accept the self-imposed economic damage that China has accepted to try and contain this outbreak? Is it reasonable to consider that national governments would close down public transport into and out of London, New York or Paris in the week before Christmas even if it were shown to be an effective control measure?\nThese decisions and questions cross the interface between public health, science and politics. The response to this outbreak in China was inevitably influenced by the historical reaction to the country's response to SARS and the world's suspicion of China's lack of cooperation at that time. The current response is therefore framed within a context of not wanting to be seen to be behaving in the same way with this event.\nThis may indicate another impact of the SARS (and MERS and Ebola) experience on the response to subsequent outbreaks – a tendency to look at worst case scenarios and respond accordingly and a fear of ‘getting it wrong’. This can deter leaders at all levels, from outbreak teams to national governments, from making judgements when all the information they would like is not available in case those judgments turn out to be wrong when the full information becomes available.\nIn emergency response it is generally better to over-react and then scale back if necessary rather than under-react and then act too late. Response should be on a ‘no regrets’ basis – make the best decisions possible on the basis of the best information and science available at the time but do not judge or criticise if later information suggests a different course of action. The early response must recognise what is known and what is not known and look at what of the unknowns can reasonably be estimated by reference to previous outbreaks, similar pathogens, early reporting and modelling, etc. The risk assessment and response can then be modified and refined as information on the unknowns evolves.\nKey to that approach, however, is confidence that decisions will not be criticised based on information that was not available at the time. It is also important to be ready to change decisions when the available information changes – something that both scientists and politicians can find difficult.\nIn that context, China should not be judged for implementing what might appear to be extreme measures but China should also be prepared to discontinue the measures quickly if evidence suggests they are not the best way to solve the problem. By closing airports the international spread from Wuhan may be decreased, but success will depend on how effective the measures really are at stopping people moving out of the affected area as well as on the behaviour of the virus. As always, only time will tell – but time is scarce."}

LitCovid-PD-MONDO

LitCovid-PD-CLO

LitCovid-PD-GO-BP

{"project":"LitCovid-PD-GO-BP","denotations":[{"id":"T4","span":{"begin":6588,"end":6597},"obj":"http://purl.obolibrary.org/obo/GO_0006810"},{"id":"T5","span":{"begin":9081,"end":9090},"obj":"http://purl.obolibrary.org/obo/GO_0007610"}],"text":"Discussion\nThe emergence of a significant respiratory illness linked to a novel coronavirus represents a test of the global capacity to detect and mange emerging disease threats. Its emergence in China adds an additional dimension in the light of previous experience with SARS. The timing of the outbreak immediately before the Chinese Lunar New Year with its attendant population movements adds extra risk and urgency to the response.\nThe rapid sharing of information in this outbreak and the speed of the coordinated response both in the country and internationally suggest that lessons have been learned from SARS that improve global capacity. The international networks and forums that now exist have facilitated the bringing together of expertise from around the world to focus research and development efforts and maximise the impact.\nAt this early stage in the outbreak information remains incomplete and key clinical and epidemiological questions have not yet been answered, but the deficit seems to be due more to the constraints of investigating an emerging disease than to any unwillingness to engage and share information with partners.\nThere are some indications of areas where further improvement is necessary. The global media response to the unfolding events has been relatively balanced and informed but the nuances of the evolving situation have not been critically examined in partnership with the media and as a result the public perception of the risk may be exaggerated – although it of course remains possible that the outbreak will develop in a way that matches up to the perceived risk. The lack of appreciation of the uncertainties in determining a meaningful case fatality rate and the significance of ascertainment bias at the beginning of an outbreak, along with the impact of aggressive case finding on case numbers, are examples of where understanding could be improved. This is always a challenging process when balancing the resources focussed on analysing the situation on the ground with resources directed at interpreting the information for journalists but in SARS, the R0 was seen to decrease in response to information reaching the public and the public then adopting risk reduction actions [6]; so accurate public risk communication is critical to success. It would be helpful to find a forum where this can be explored with the media community after the event.\nThe increase in access to early information from diverse sources including media and social media adds an important dimension to identifying and tracking new events globally and is a key part of the overall epidemic intelligence system. However, it is also a potential source of disinformation. When, as has been seen in this outbreak, the volume of information coming in exceeds any capacity to collate and analyse it and to attempt to cross-reference and verify separate items, there is a risk that the information fuels speculation and media and public concern. Again there is a fine balance between information that encourages appropriate risk avoidance actions and information that encourages inappropriate actions; however the public health is usually better served by more information rather than less.\nThe role of a declaration of a PHEIC in managing a serious outbreak has been questioned in the light of Ebola in West Africa and in the Democratic Republic of Congo [9] and has been challenged again with this outbreak. The binary nature of a PHEIC declaration (either an event is a PHEIC or it isn't – there are no intermediate options) and the specificity of the three defined criteria for a PHEIC have caused difficulty for Emergency Committees in considering whether a given event should be a PHEIC. The lack of a clear understanding of what a PHEIC declaration is meant to achieve adds to the Emergency Committee's difficulties, as does the relative paucity of clinical and epidemiological answers at this stage of the investigation. In this instance the Emergency Committee were divided in coming to a conclusion but decided on balance that the current situation, although an emergency, should not as yet be declared a PHEIC [2]. As with Ebola in the DRC, there has been criticism of the WHO for this decision but, as with Ebola, it is not immediately clear what would be different in the response if a PHEIC was declared.\nThe WHO is working on improving the way in which Emergency Committees develop their advice for the Director General but, as recommended by this Emergency Committee and the post-Ebola IHR Review Committee in 2015, the development of an intermediate alert alongside WHO's risk assessment process may be helpful.\nA key function of a PHEIC declaration is that it is the (only) gateway to the WHO Temporary Recommendations on possible travel and trade restrictions to limit international spread of a disease. In this case several countries globally had already implemented entry screening at airports and China had begun closing down international travel from Wuhan before the Emergency Committee had finished their deliberations. While the WHO would not, and could not, interfere with the sovereign decisions of member states, the lack of influence on travel and trade decisions could prove problematic.\nAlongside the speed of the response in this outbreak, we have seen dramatic changes in the scale of the response. The imposition of very extensive quarantine measures on millions of people as an attempt to break the transmission of the virus is unprecedented. We do not know whether they will be effective; indeed we do not know how we will determine if they have been effective – what end point can we measure that will provide an answer to that question? If recent suggestions that people infected with this coronavirus may be infectious while incubating or asymptomatic, and the reports that up to 5 m people left Wuhan before the travel restrictions were imposed, are confirmed, the efficacy of these control measures will be more challenged.\nGiven the likely impact on at least the Chinese economy and probably the global economy, it will be important to understand the role and the effectiveness of public health measures on this scale for the future.\nHowever, the imposition of these dramatic measures does also raise a wider question: if there is an impact from these measures, what other countries would (or could) implement such measures? Would other countries accept the self-imposed economic damage that China has accepted to try and contain this outbreak? Is it reasonable to consider that national governments would close down public transport into and out of London, New York or Paris in the week before Christmas even if it were shown to be an effective control measure?\nThese decisions and questions cross the interface between public health, science and politics. The response to this outbreak in China was inevitably influenced by the historical reaction to the country's response to SARS and the world's suspicion of China's lack of cooperation at that time. The current response is therefore framed within a context of not wanting to be seen to be behaving in the same way with this event.\nThis may indicate another impact of the SARS (and MERS and Ebola) experience on the response to subsequent outbreaks – a tendency to look at worst case scenarios and respond accordingly and a fear of ‘getting it wrong’. This can deter leaders at all levels, from outbreak teams to national governments, from making judgements when all the information they would like is not available in case those judgments turn out to be wrong when the full information becomes available.\nIn emergency response it is generally better to over-react and then scale back if necessary rather than under-react and then act too late. Response should be on a ‘no regrets’ basis – make the best decisions possible on the basis of the best information and science available at the time but do not judge or criticise if later information suggests a different course of action. The early response must recognise what is known and what is not known and look at what of the unknowns can reasonably be estimated by reference to previous outbreaks, similar pathogens, early reporting and modelling, etc. The risk assessment and response can then be modified and refined as information on the unknowns evolves.\nKey to that approach, however, is confidence that decisions will not be criticised based on information that was not available at the time. It is also important to be ready to change decisions when the available information changes – something that both scientists and politicians can find difficult.\nIn that context, China should not be judged for implementing what might appear to be extreme measures but China should also be prepared to discontinue the measures quickly if evidence suggests they are not the best way to solve the problem. By closing airports the international spread from Wuhan may be decreased, but success will depend on how effective the measures really are at stopping people moving out of the affected area as well as on the behaviour of the virus. As always, only time will tell – but time is scarce."}

LitCovid-sentences

LitCovid-PD-HP

{"project":"LitCovid-PD-HP","denotations":[{"id":"T3","span":{"begin":42,"end":61},"obj":"Phenotype"}],"attributes":[{"id":"A3","pred":"hp_id","subj":"T3","obj":"http://purl.obolibrary.org/obo/HP_0002086"}],"text":"Discussion\nThe emergence of a significant respiratory illness linked to a novel coronavirus represents a test of the global capacity to detect and mange emerging disease threats. Its emergence in China adds an additional dimension in the light of previous experience with SARS. The timing of the outbreak immediately before the Chinese Lunar New Year with its attendant population movements adds extra risk and urgency to the response.\nThe rapid sharing of information in this outbreak and the speed of the coordinated response both in the country and internationally suggest that lessons have been learned from SARS that improve global capacity. The international networks and forums that now exist have facilitated the bringing together of expertise from around the world to focus research and development efforts and maximise the impact.\nAt this early stage in the outbreak information remains incomplete and key clinical and epidemiological questions have not yet been answered, but the deficit seems to be due more to the constraints of investigating an emerging disease than to any unwillingness to engage and share information with partners.\nThere are some indications of areas where further improvement is necessary. The global media response to the unfolding events has been relatively balanced and informed but the nuances of the evolving situation have not been critically examined in partnership with the media and as a result the public perception of the risk may be exaggerated – although it of course remains possible that the outbreak will develop in a way that matches up to the perceived risk. The lack of appreciation of the uncertainties in determining a meaningful case fatality rate and the significance of ascertainment bias at the beginning of an outbreak, along with the impact of aggressive case finding on case numbers, are examples of where understanding could be improved. This is always a challenging process when balancing the resources focussed on analysing the situation on the ground with resources directed at interpreting the information for journalists but in SARS, the R0 was seen to decrease in response to information reaching the public and the public then adopting risk reduction actions [6]; so accurate public risk communication is critical to success. It would be helpful to find a forum where this can be explored with the media community after the event.\nThe increase in access to early information from diverse sources including media and social media adds an important dimension to identifying and tracking new events globally and is a key part of the overall epidemic intelligence system. However, it is also a potential source of disinformation. When, as has been seen in this outbreak, the volume of information coming in exceeds any capacity to collate and analyse it and to attempt to cross-reference and verify separate items, there is a risk that the information fuels speculation and media and public concern. Again there is a fine balance between information that encourages appropriate risk avoidance actions and information that encourages inappropriate actions; however the public health is usually better served by more information rather than less.\nThe role of a declaration of a PHEIC in managing a serious outbreak has been questioned in the light of Ebola in West Africa and in the Democratic Republic of Congo [9] and has been challenged again with this outbreak. The binary nature of a PHEIC declaration (either an event is a PHEIC or it isn't – there are no intermediate options) and the specificity of the three defined criteria for a PHEIC have caused difficulty for Emergency Committees in considering whether a given event should be a PHEIC. The lack of a clear understanding of what a PHEIC declaration is meant to achieve adds to the Emergency Committee's difficulties, as does the relative paucity of clinical and epidemiological answers at this stage of the investigation. In this instance the Emergency Committee were divided in coming to a conclusion but decided on balance that the current situation, although an emergency, should not as yet be declared a PHEIC [2]. As with Ebola in the DRC, there has been criticism of the WHO for this decision but, as with Ebola, it is not immediately clear what would be different in the response if a PHEIC was declared.\nThe WHO is working on improving the way in which Emergency Committees develop their advice for the Director General but, as recommended by this Emergency Committee and the post-Ebola IHR Review Committee in 2015, the development of an intermediate alert alongside WHO's risk assessment process may be helpful.\nA key function of a PHEIC declaration is that it is the (only) gateway to the WHO Temporary Recommendations on possible travel and trade restrictions to limit international spread of a disease. In this case several countries globally had already implemented entry screening at airports and China had begun closing down international travel from Wuhan before the Emergency Committee had finished their deliberations. While the WHO would not, and could not, interfere with the sovereign decisions of member states, the lack of influence on travel and trade decisions could prove problematic.\nAlongside the speed of the response in this outbreak, we have seen dramatic changes in the scale of the response. The imposition of very extensive quarantine measures on millions of people as an attempt to break the transmission of the virus is unprecedented. We do not know whether they will be effective; indeed we do not know how we will determine if they have been effective – what end point can we measure that will provide an answer to that question? If recent suggestions that people infected with this coronavirus may be infectious while incubating or asymptomatic, and the reports that up to 5 m people left Wuhan before the travel restrictions were imposed, are confirmed, the efficacy of these control measures will be more challenged.\nGiven the likely impact on at least the Chinese economy and probably the global economy, it will be important to understand the role and the effectiveness of public health measures on this scale for the future.\nHowever, the imposition of these dramatic measures does also raise a wider question: if there is an impact from these measures, what other countries would (or could) implement such measures? Would other countries accept the self-imposed economic damage that China has accepted to try and contain this outbreak? Is it reasonable to consider that national governments would close down public transport into and out of London, New York or Paris in the week before Christmas even if it were shown to be an effective control measure?\nThese decisions and questions cross the interface between public health, science and politics. The response to this outbreak in China was inevitably influenced by the historical reaction to the country's response to SARS and the world's suspicion of China's lack of cooperation at that time. The current response is therefore framed within a context of not wanting to be seen to be behaving in the same way with this event.\nThis may indicate another impact of the SARS (and MERS and Ebola) experience on the response to subsequent outbreaks – a tendency to look at worst case scenarios and respond accordingly and a fear of ‘getting it wrong’. This can deter leaders at all levels, from outbreak teams to national governments, from making judgements when all the information they would like is not available in case those judgments turn out to be wrong when the full information becomes available.\nIn emergency response it is generally better to over-react and then scale back if necessary rather than under-react and then act too late. Response should be on a ‘no regrets’ basis – make the best decisions possible on the basis of the best information and science available at the time but do not judge or criticise if later information suggests a different course of action. The early response must recognise what is known and what is not known and look at what of the unknowns can reasonably be estimated by reference to previous outbreaks, similar pathogens, early reporting and modelling, etc. The risk assessment and response can then be modified and refined as information on the unknowns evolves.\nKey to that approach, however, is confidence that decisions will not be criticised based on information that was not available at the time. It is also important to be ready to change decisions when the available information changes – something that both scientists and politicians can find difficult.\nIn that context, China should not be judged for implementing what might appear to be extreme measures but China should also be prepared to discontinue the measures quickly if evidence suggests they are not the best way to solve the problem. By closing airports the international spread from Wuhan may be decreased, but success will depend on how effective the measures really are at stopping people moving out of the affected area as well as on the behaviour of the virus. As always, only time will tell – but time is scarce."}

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