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The urgency of the analyzed issue is due to the fact that the institutional credibility of money is one of the factors determining the formation of a new model of management of the monetary sphere, which allows generating long-term money in the economy, ensuring economic stability in times of crisis, as well as contributing to the reproduction of the horizontal type of coordination of socio-economic relationship. The purpose of the article is the theoretical-methodological basis of institutional trust influence of money on the development of the monetary sphere. The leading approaches are historical-economic, institutional and evolutionary, elements of econometric modeling, tools of financial analysis which substantiate the impact of institutional trust on the development of the monetary sphere. It was revealed that the institutional credibility of money is a complex three-tier structure having multiple forms. It is proved that the combined index of confidence in financial institutions has a high degree of consistency in terms of the dynamics of the index of consumer sentiment, and was developed an econometric model. It is shown that the transformation of traditional ideas about the evolution of the issue of money in the context of the increasing importance of confidence to economic entities from the institutions of the monetary sphere. It revealed the necessity to build a fiduciary rating of economic entities for the purpose of determining the amount of private money, issued by market participants, and it will increase the transparency of the information about potential users of banking services and will contribute to the stability of the monetary sphere, the growth of the welfare of individuals. The article data may be used in the development of the monetary policy of central banks, aimed at creating conditions for economic growth. The Paris conference and the Econometrica symposium of 1952 marked the acceptance of expected utility theory as the mainstream model for risky choices in economics, and were instrumental in establishing the "Independence Axiom" as the standard name for the key underlying postulate. Indeed, most of the arguments in favor and against expected utility theory discussed in Paris and in the Econometrica symposium had been already addressed by Samuelson, Savage, Marschak, and Friedman in their intense correspondence between May and September 1950. But while these four major economists all came to accept expected utility theory, their reasons were not the same. Among them, only Friedman accepted expected utility theory because he judged it empirically valid. Marschak, in contrast, accepted the theory because he found the axioms underlying it normatively appealing (see also Marschak 1951). Samuelson remained skeptical about the descriptive power of expected utility theory, and only came to accept the theory when, through the lens of Savage's Sure-Thing Principle, he came to view the Independence Axiom as a requisite for rational behavior in conditions of risk, and thus as normatively compelling. Savage initially advocated expected utility theory by appealing to its simplicity, empirical validity, and normative plausibility, but his controversy with Samuelson induced him to focus on the normative defense of the theory, which he perfected by formulating the Sure-Thing Principle. The correspondence between Samuelson and Savage of May-August 1950 enhanced the fortunes of expected utility theory in at least two important ways. First, it won over to the cause of expected utility theory a prominent economist, namely Samuelson, who after 1950 contributed to stabilizing the theory as the dominant economic model of choice under risk. Second, it induced Savage to articulate the Sure-Thing Principle, which later became the central normative argument in favor of the theory.