PMC:7795931 / 35822-37525 JSONTXT

{"project":"LitCovid-PubTator","denotations":[{"id":"163","span":{"begin":176,"end":185},"obj":"Disease"},{"id":"169","span":{"begin":1015,"end":1021},"obj":"Species"},{"id":"170","span":{"begin":603,"end":623},"obj":"Disease"},{"id":"171","span":{"begin":662,"end":672},"obj":"Disease"},{"id":"172","span":{"begin":825,"end":833},"obj":"Disease"},{"id":"173","span":{"begin":965,"end":974},"obj":"Disease"},{"id":"176","span":{"begin":1488,"end":1496},"obj":"Disease"},{"id":"177","span":{"begin":1692,"end":1702},"obj":"Disease"}],"attributes":[{"id":"A163","pred":"tao:has_database_id","subj":"163","obj":"MESH:D007239"},{"id":"A169","pred":"tao:has_database_id","subj":"169","obj":"Tax:9606"},{"id":"A170","pred":"tao:has_database_id","subj":"170","obj":"MESH:C000657245"},{"id":"A171","pred":"tao:has_database_id","subj":"171","obj":"MESH:D007239"},{"id":"A172","pred":"tao:has_database_id","subj":"172","obj":"MESH:D007239"},{"id":"A173","pred":"tao:has_database_id","subj":"173","obj":"MESH:D007239"},{"id":"A176","pred":"tao:has_database_id","subj":"176","obj":"MESH:C000657245"},{"id":"A177","pred":"tao:has_database_id","subj":"177","obj":"MESH:D007239"}],"namespaces":[{"prefix":"Tax","uri":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/taxonomy/"},{"prefix":"MESH","uri":"https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/"},{"prefix":"Gene","uri":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gene/"},{"prefix":"CVCL","uri":"https://web.expasy.org/cellosaurus/CVCL_"}],"text":"3.4. Optimal Intervention under Different Government Types\nIn previous sections, our study was based on the neutral government assumption that governments only seek the lowest infection rate. However, in reality, a government is not a personalized organization pursuing social optimum because it is often checked by various inside and outside nodes. In addition, government credibility makes a difference as well. In this section, we will discuss the optimal strategy for non-neutral governments and low-credible governments.\nAn unaccountable government that evades responsibilities would only care for lower new infections after intervention rather than global infections, which digresses from the objective described above. As shown in Figure 6a, the later the government discloses information, the less that will be newly infected after disclosure. There are two underlying reasons: (1) late disclosed information will indeed be more accurate, which reduces the infection rate; and (2) there are less uninfected people at the time of disclosing. Therefore, a blame-evading government would delay the disclosing to avoid being held accountable.\nA conservative government that prefers the least error-prone strategy (minimizing maximum loss) rather than the optimal one (the loss minimization strategy) would block all the information (Figure 6b). Since the optimal strategy would not be accessed until all external conditions are fully judged and scrutinized, which is not feasible for COVID-19, complete blocking would be optimal for such a government to avoid the worst case scenario. Our experiment of 484 different scenarios manifests a complete blocking will never lead to the highest infections."}

{"project":"LitCovid-sentences","denotations":[{"id":"T225","span":{"begin":0,"end":4},"obj":"Sentence"},{"id":"T226","span":{"begin":5,"end":58},"obj":"Sentence"},{"id":"T227","span":{"begin":59,"end":191},"obj":"Sentence"},{"id":"T228","span":{"begin":192,"end":349},"obj":"Sentence"},{"id":"T229","span":{"begin":350,"end":413},"obj":"Sentence"},{"id":"T230","span":{"begin":414,"end":525},"obj":"Sentence"},{"id":"T231","span":{"begin":526,"end":725},"obj":"Sentence"},{"id":"T232","span":{"begin":726,"end":851},"obj":"Sentence"},{"id":"T233","span":{"begin":852,"end":1048},"obj":"Sentence"},{"id":"T234","span":{"begin":1049,"end":1146},"obj":"Sentence"},{"id":"T235","span":{"begin":1147,"end":1348},"obj":"Sentence"},{"id":"T236","span":{"begin":1349,"end":1588},"obj":"Sentence"},{"id":"T237","span":{"begin":1589,"end":1703},"obj":"Sentence"}],"namespaces":[{"prefix":"_base","uri":"http://pubannotation.org/ontology/tao.owl#"}],"text":"3.4. Optimal Intervention under Different Government Types\nIn previous sections, our study was based on the neutral government assumption that governments only seek the lowest infection rate. However, in reality, a government is not a personalized organization pursuing social optimum because it is often checked by various inside and outside nodes. In addition, government credibility makes a difference as well. In this section, we will discuss the optimal strategy for non-neutral governments and low-credible governments.\nAn unaccountable government that evades responsibilities would only care for lower new infections after intervention rather than global infections, which digresses from the objective described above. As shown in Figure 6a, the later the government discloses information, the less that will be newly infected after disclosure. There are two underlying reasons: (1) late disclosed information will indeed be more accurate, which reduces the infection rate; and (2) there are less uninfected people at the time of disclosing. Therefore, a blame-evading government would delay the disclosing to avoid being held accountable.\nA conservative government that prefers the least error-prone strategy (minimizing maximum loss) rather than the optimal one (the loss minimization strategy) would block all the information (Figure 6b). Since the optimal strategy would not be accessed until all external conditions are fully judged and scrutinized, which is not feasible for COVID-19, complete blocking would be optimal for such a government to avoid the worst case scenario. Our experiment of 484 different scenarios manifests a complete blocking will never lead to the highest infections."}