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Re-Thinking the Role of Government Information Intervention in the COVID-19 Pandemic: An Agent-Based Modeling Analysis Abstract The COVID-19 pandemic imposes new challenges on the capability of governments in intervening with the information dissemination and reducing the risk of infection outbreak. To reveal the complexity behind government intervention decision, we build a bi-layer network diffusion model for the information-disease dynamics that were intervened in and conduct a full space simulation to illustrate the trade-off faced by governments between information disclosing and blocking. The simulation results show that governments prioritize the accuracy of disclosed information over the disclosing speed when there is a high-level medical recognition of the virus and a high public health awareness, while, for the opposite situation, more strict information blocking is preferred. Furthermore, an unaccountable government tends to delay disclosing, a risk-averse government prefers a total blocking, and a low government credibility will discount the effect of information disclosing and aggravate the situation. These findings suggest that information intervention is indispensable for containing the outbreak of infectious disease, but its effectiveness depends on a complicated way on both external social/epidemic factors and the governments’ internal preferences and governance capability, for which more thorough investigations are needed in the future. 1. Introduction The COVID-19 pandemic has attacked the whole world over the past few months. The key features of the Novel Coronavirus, such as long incubation period, high infectiousness, and asymptomatic transmission, were not perceived at the beginning until they were gradually unveiled [1,2,3,4]. The WHO and governments keep disclosing epidemic information, but the disclosure is based on their own endowments, preferences, and perceptions, resulting in misleading information at least in the early stage of COVID-19 outbreak, such as “Masks work? NO” (quoted from Scott Atlas, the White House coronavirus task force member), “This is a flu. This is like a flu” (quoted from Donald Trump, the president of the US), and “There is some immune system variation with Asian people”(quoted form Taro Aso, the Deputy Prime Minister of Japan), etc. This information failed to alert the public but let their guards down instead. Then, the high mortality rate and emergency announcements subsequently incited widespread fear and exacerbated the epidemic situation. Theoretically, a systematic provision of timely and effective information from the government can mitigate the downsides [5]. However, in the real world, speed entails inaccuracy and cognitive uncertainty that keep government away from accomplishing such a tough mission [6]. Thus, in the early stage of an epidemic with strong externalities like COVID-19, the government’s choice between timeliness and effectiveness of intervention strategies raises a theoretical challenge for the management of urgent public health crisis. The key to successfully contain the spread of an unexpected disease like COVID-19 is to understand the complicated two-way interaction between the dynamics of disease and those of information (and the human behavior response to information) [7]. Information might either amplify or diminish the public’s response to a risk event, depending on the transmission of risk information and public’s reactions at the time it occurs [8]. At the micro-level, one’s behavior depends on the epidemiological status of the disease, the individual’s knowledge about it (information accessed), misinformation, and the individual’s education and income level [9]. Along with the spread of disease in social life (physical level), information spreads in a virtual network, which brings the awareness of crisis for people [10,11,12], leading them to take preventive measures to stay healthy [13,14]. Therefore, the spread of disease facilitates the spread of information, which in turn inhibits the spread of disease [15,16]. However, on the other hand, people usually get illogical, fail to discern falsity, and disregard the truth during information dissemination [17,18]. Misleading information seems to have a natural disposition to resonate with public opinions, which causes spontaneous misrepresentation in transmission [19]. In addition, discussions on epidemic bring panic [20] and aggravate the harm of the epidemic [21], which will be further exaggerated by social media [22]. Meanwhile, increasing uncertainty about the disease makes people feel loss of control and boost people’s anxiety [23], usually accompanied by psychological distress [24]. Therefore, information is critical to fighting against the COVID-19-crisis [25,26], and improper information management strategy may lead to systematic failure [27]. The government, as the main governing body, is the most critical (information) node in the entire network, since it can intervene in information by “blocking” [28,29] and “disclosing” [5,30]. The minimal blocking implies a free and open information environment, which stimulates information to be widely diffused and induces more people to take self-protective measures [31], but “rumors” might also proliferate at the mean time [24]. Even if (under certain premises) some “rumors” are accurate [7,32,33], it might still interrupt the prevention efforts to the epidemic. It is always believed that government should perform as a central node to disclose accurate and up-to-date information to the entire society, so as to keep the public away from untruthful information and prompt the public to make informed decisions about health protection [30,34]. However, in the real world, governments do face time constraints and the trade-off between being accurate and being up-to-date in terms of information disclosing, which is not considered in classical information theory. Because a highly infectious disease caused by unknown viruses with great externality, such as COVID-19, spreads together with information of varying qualities (truthfulness, accuracy, etc.), it is highly probable that the disease has already contaminated the society before low-quality information is purged. In this case, the government has no way to disclose accurate information in time, resulting in the loss of public trust and raising the doubt of the public on the governing capacity of the government, which will accelerate epidemic outbreak [35,36,37]. Therefore, governments need to not only decide when to inject information into the network, but also whether to follow the tenet that governments do not and should not block information spreading at any circumstance [38]. For information blocking, studies have been conducted in theoretical [39,40,41], in empirical [42,43], in case studies [43,44], and other perspectives. These studies argued that, even if governments have the power to control information [45], they should not do that because free spread of information is essential to welfare-maximizing [38]. This argument is based on two underlying assumptions: (1) publishers are completely competitive to reach an equilibrium of disclosing accurate information; (2) there is no time constraint. These two assumptions do not apply for COVID-19 because, in the age of Internet media, people are not incentive compatible to spread accurate information. Moreover, such highly externalized infectious diseases caused by unknown viruses might have already infected a considerable amount of people before low-quality information is purified, so the government should not simply adhere to the tenet of not blocking information when facing an unknown health crisis [38]. As a result, we will discuss the complexity and diversity in information blocking and broaden current information control theory. By the discussion so far, we notice that the successful containment of epidemic outbreak relies on the successful management on the information dissemination process, which, however, is hard to achieve in the real world. To better understand the failure in containing the COVID-19 pandemic, we here construct an information-behavior bi-layer model by adding a parallel layer of information transmission to the classical SI (Susceptible-Infected) model of infectious diseases. We intend to describe the effect of heterogeneous virtual information (at information layer) on heterogeneous nodes’ behaviors (at physical layer) [46]. The government, as the key node in information network, can influence the entire network through information disclosing and blocking. Based on this, we assign values to key variables such as the medical awareness level of the virus and the public’s health awareness level and then conduct computer simulation experiments under different scenarios. We reveal the pattern of government information intervention based on the simulation results. In addition, we only focus on the emergence stage of the infectious disease, during which the recovery from the infected status, such as self-healing and cure of the disease, is omitted [47]; therefore, the base model is the SI model rather than the SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Recovery) model. Based on the bi-layered network model, we explore two main themes: how disease spreads affect information spreads and how information affects the efficiency of controlling the epidemic. We introduce the non-dualism of information and the heterogeneity of nodes’ behaviors into the epidemic model and conduct a simulation to reveal the information intervention dilemma faced by the government between information disclosing and blocking. We find that governments face a trade-off between speed and accuracy in information disclosing; and the optimal strategy is contingent on varying conditions in information blocking. The optimal combination of disclosing and blocking is highly sensitive to the government preference and its governance capacity. Governments that are only responsible for the outcome of intervention will focus unilaterally on the accuracy at the expense of speed; a risk-averse government that intends to minimize the maximum infection rate under uncertain scenarios will impose a more restrictive blocking; and the most restrictive blocking strategy might be the best for governments with lower capability and credibility. In summary, this paper makes several important contributions to the literature. First, existing studies did not pay sufficient attention to the spread and evolution of rumors during a public crisis [48,49,50], which is considered in our study. We expounded the impacts of information dissemination on epidemic evolution in scenarios with different levels of medical awareness of the virus, public health awareness, and government preferences and credibilities, which complements the research in this field. Second, most current studies regard information and disease transmissions as simultaneously happened and jointly induced by the physical movement of an agent [46], while this is not the case during COVID-19 pandemic as the internet obviates the needs for physical contact in information transmissions [51]. Thus, in our paper, we separate the information and disease transmissions and investigate the impact of heterogeneous information on the individual behaviors and disease dynamics. Third, unlike previous research on government information interventions with known risk [5,28,29,30], ours are on government information interventions with unknown risk. The lack of prior knowledge on the Corona-SARS-2 is the most striking feature of the COVID-19 pandemic, which weakens the usefulness of government action and calls for a reassessment of government information intervention under a crisis environment with high uncertainty. To this end, this paper demonstrates a couple of intervention dilemmas faced by government, which complements the existing theories. 2. Methods 2.1. The Model of Information Disclosing The information dissemination system resp. behavioral response system is embedded in the information network resp. physical network. Both networks are given as follows. Information network: the network has (N+1) nodes, first N are individual nodes representing N individuals denoted as i,i=1,2,⋯N, and one government information node denoted as j. The degree of an individual node i is denoted as yi, which obeys a power-law distribution, that is, Fyi∝yi−v, where F(·) is the CDF and yi satisfies ϵ≤1∕yi≤1, where ϵ is a small constant to avoid the degree to blow up. Degree and degree distribution are concepts used in graph theory and network theory. A graph (or network) consists of a number of vertices (nodes) and the edges (links) that connect them. The number of edges (links) connected to each vertex (node) is the degree of the vertex (node). The degree distribution is a general description of the number of degrees of vertices (nodes) in a graph (or network), and, for random graphs, the degree distribution is the probability distribution of the number of degrees of vertices in the graph, which usually assumes a power-law distribution. Throughout the following analysis, we take v=−1 and ϵ=0.01. The government node j (representing real-world government) discloses information to every individual node and can only obtain information from n1 (n1≪N) (The notation “≪” means that the number n1 must be far less than the number N.) random nodes. The neighborhood of an individual node i is the set of all other nodes (including j) it connects with, denoted as Oi. Physical network: the physical network has M nodes, including n2 “special” nodes defined as the “gathering spots”, which predisposes these nodes to this epidemic. Mt denotes the distribution of locations of all N individuals during period t, and M0 is the initial distribution that can be viewed as the “home” for every individual (node), thus at the beginning of each period t the individuals move from M0 to Mt and return back to M0 at the end of period t. Home coordinates M0 and gathering spots are randomly assigned and different from each other, so we have N+n2
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